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I. INTRODUCTION
Confidential sources serve a key role in private securities fraud
litigation, meritorious and otherwise. Allowing plaintiffs to withhold
a source’s identity at the pleading stage allows insiders to expose
securities fraud without fear of reprisal.1 At the same time, a
fabricated confidential source stands as a tempting shortcut for the
plaintiff who hopes to bypass the heightened pleading requirements
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)2 and “use
discovery merely as a fishing expedition in the hope that something
will turn up.”3
* J.D., with Highest Honors, Florida State University College of Law, 2010; B.S.,
with honors, University of Florida, 2005. The Author thanks Professor Barbara Banoff for
her valuable comments and guidance in the development of an earlier draft of this Note.
The Author also thanks Nathan Paulich and Jayne Ashley Ross Phillips for their
thoughtful insights and review.
1. See Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing
Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 554-56 (2007).
2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3. In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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Congress enacted PSLRA in 1995 with the stated legislative aim
of combating frivolous securities litigation.4 Toward this end, PSLRA
included a range of changes to the process of pursuing securities
litigation,5 not the least of which was a heightening of applicable
pleading standards.6 PSLRA consequently did not provide identical
standards for pleading the various aspects of securities fraud.
Rather, it provided one standard for pleading the required state of
mind (scienter)7 and another for pleading falsity.8 This Note will
focus on the latter of those two standards. Congress raised the
standard for pleading falsity by adding the following provisions to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934:9
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions
(1) Misleading statements and omissions
In any private action arising under [the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934] in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant—
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.10

It further provides that “the court shall, on the motion of any
defendant, dismiss the complaint if the [pleading] requirements . . .
are not met” and that “all discovery and other proceedings shall be
stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss.”11
As a practical matter, PSLRA’s requirements for pleading falsity
along with the still applicable requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)12 create a unique set of limitations and opportunities
that make the use of confidential sources simultaneously more
4. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
5. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) (providing for, among other things,
changes to the class certification process, appointment of a lead plaintiff, heightened
pleading standards, and limitations on damages in securities fraud litigation brought
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
6. See id. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2).
7. See id. § 78u-4(b)(2). In the context of a securities fraud case, the requisite state of
mind is intention to deceive. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S.
588, 593 (2001); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—Federal § 1194 (2008).
8. § 78u-4(b)(1).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
10. § 78u-4(b)(1) (emphasis added).
11. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A)-(B).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (providing that when “alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”).
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appealing and more complicated. While the recent Supreme Court
decision Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. provides some
insight on the use of confidential sources in the pleading of scienter,13
there remains considerably less consensus on their use in pleading
falsity. This Note explores the evolution of courts’ approaches to the
use of confidential sources to plead falsity, special concerns regarding
fabricated sources, and the potential pitfalls of the existing analysis.
In the end, this Note proposes a revised process for evaluating
confidential sources.
Part I examines PSLRA’s legislative background as well as its
early judicial interpretation as it relates to the use of confidential
sources to show falsity. Part II begins with an overview of Novak v.
Kasaks,14 the landmark case that rejected the notion that PSLRA
summarily precludes the use of unnamed sources in securities fraud
cases. It continues with an exploration of the adoption of Novak
throughout the circuits and the three approaches that have emerged:
the original Novak approach, the holistic approach, and a more
permissive version of the holistic approach. Part III examines the
fabrication concerns inherent in the assessment of confidential
sources. It then looks at the potential evaluative pitfalls that stem
from those concerns including impermissible judicial evaluations of
source reliability and credibility at the pleading stage. Finally, Part
III argues for a two-step process where courts would look first for
adequate assurances that unnamed sources are not fabricated. If
adequate assurances are found, only then would a court evaluate the
sufficiency of the facts pled with the level of judicial skepticism
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Background
In contrast to the atmosphere in which Congress passed the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 PSLRA was enacted amidst
outspoken congressional concern that securities litigation had
become excessive and harmful.

13. See 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (holding that to survive the pleadings stage, an
inference of scienter must not only be plausible but also at least as strong as competing
inferences); see also infra Part IV.B.1 discussing the implications of Tellabs.
14. 26 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
15. Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with an eye toward curbing
harms caused by market manipulation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2006) (“National
emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of trade,
transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect
the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and
sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on
such exchanges and markets . . . .”).
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There is broad agreement on the need for reform. Shareholders’
groups, corporate America, the SEC, and many lawyers want to
curb these abusive practices.
Lawyers who bring meritorious suits do not benefit when
strikesuit artists wreak havoc on the Nation’s boardrooms
and courthouses.
Our economy does not benefit when the threat of litigation
deters capital formation.16

Specifically, congressional supporters of the Act pointed to harm
caused by meritless lawsuits filed against corporations and others
with “deep pocket[s]” in response to any significant decline in stock
price, irrespective of the defendants’ culpability.17 These suits, the
Conference Committee Report posited, abused the potentially costly
discovery process with minimal hope of uncovering facts to support a
cause of action and forced defendants into coerced settlements.18 It
further noted the harms arising from discovery being used as a
“fishing expedition” during which the target company’s documents
are scoured for statements or actions which can be tenuously
assembled into a claim.19
Congress intended PSLRA “to establish a uniform and stringent
pleading requirement.”20 Even before PSLRA’s enactment, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) already established a more onerous
pleading standard for fraud by requiring that allegations of fraud
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”21
Although PSLRA is broader in scope than the explicit requirements of
Rule 9(b), its provisions represent a clarification and codification of
existing case law in some federal circuits. PSLRA’s requirement that a
complaint specify why allegedly false or misleading statements are
false or misleading closely parallels Rule 9(b)’s insistence on stating
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.22 Similarly,
16. Sec. Litig. Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 8-9
(1995) (statement of Sen. Alfonse M. D’Amato, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs); see also id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Member, S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs) (“The flaws in the current private securities
litigation system are simply too obvious to deny. The record is replete with examples of
how the system is being abused and misused.”). While a great deal of legislative sentiment
had coalesced around this principle, a majority of support for PSLRA came from the newly
elected Republican majority. See 141 CONG. REC. 37,807, 38,354 (1995). Notable critics of
the Act include former president Bill Clinton, see 141 CONG. REC. 37,797-98 (1995), over
whose veto PSLRA was ultimately enacted. See 141 CONG. REC. 37,807, 38,354.
17. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 37, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
20. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
22. Prior to PSLRA’s passage, Rule 9(b)’s broad requirement of “the circumstances
constituting fraud” had been interpreted along the lines explicitly spelled out in PSLRA.
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PSLRA’s requirement that a statement of all particularized facts
accompany allegations made on information and belief largely codifies
the pre-PSLRA application of Rule 9(b) to information and belief
pleading.23 Prior to the Act, courts held that plaintiffs could not satisfy
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement as to fraud with allegations
based on information and belief.24 The exception was the situation in
which the matters in question were uniquely within the defendant’s
knowledge and of which a plaintiff would not be expected to have
personal knowledge.25 Even when this exception applied, a plaintiff
had to put forth facts that supported his or her belief.26 Congress
designed these areas of overlap to eliminate inconsistencies arising
from different interpretations of Rule 9(b) across the various circuits.27
B. Early Application of PSLRA to Pleading Falsity with
Confidential Sources
Not surprisingly, PSLRA’s requirement that a plaintiff plead “all
facts” on which they based information and belief claims gave rise to
a knotty problem when complaints relied on confidential sources in
their allegations of falsity. Courts initially wrestled with how far “all
facts” should extend and the degree to which it encompasses the
identity of confidential sources at the pleading stage, finally settling
on a literal reading.28 In support of this interpretation, some courts
See, e.g., Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that Plaintiffs
satisfied the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) by “set[ing] out the representations on
which they relied, stating both what financial figures they were given and what they
alleged the true financial figures were[;] . . . specif[ying] who was alleged to have made the
false statements; and . . . stat[ing] the precise dates and places of the meetings at which
they alleged the fraudulent statements were made”); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d
Cir. 1989) (“To satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), a complaint must
adequately specify the statements it claims were false or misleading, give particulars as to
the respect in which plaintiff contends the statements were fraudulent, state when and
where the statements were made, and identify those responsible for the statements.”).
23. Plaintiffs plead facts on information and belief when they do not have direct
knowledge, but have been informed of the facts in question and believe them to be true. See
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997); United
States v. Twenty-Five Barrels of Alcohol, 18 F. Cas. 252, 256 (E.D. Mo. 1868).
24. See, e.g., Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993); Stern v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1991); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc.,
822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 54 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986).
25. See, e.g., Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672.
26. See, e.g., id.
27. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694
(“The courts of appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways, creating distinctly
different pleading standards among the circuits. The Committee does not adopt a new and
untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the
Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second
Circuit.”).
28. See Party City Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 282, 304-05 (D.N.J. 2001); Novak v.
Kasaks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
970 F. Supp. 746, 763-64 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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cited congressional rejection of an amendment to PSLRA that would
have lowered plaintiffs’ pleading burden as an indication that
Congress intended for plaintiffs to name their confidential sources.29
III. ACCEPTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
A. Novak v. Kasaks
The interpretation of “all facts” as precluding confidential sources
was ultimately not widely adopted. The Second Circuit in Novak v.
Kasaks30 applied a more flexible approach to PSLRA’s particularity
requirement and established a mechanism by which a complaint
could survive a motion to dismiss without naming confidential
sources.31 Initially, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint for insufficient particularity, citing PSLRA’s “all facts”
requirement for allegations based on information and belief.32
On appeal, the Second Circuit characterized the policy reasoning
that underpinned the district court’s ruling, as well as that relied
upon by the defense,33 as a “misreading” of PSLRA’s legislative
history based on merely “hyperbolic statements of legislators
attempting (unsuccessfully) to amend the proposed [a]ct . . . .”34 It
further reasoned that, from a practical standpoint, Congress must
not have intended PSLRA’s “all facts” to be applied literally.35 The
court rationalized,
Reading “all” literally would produce illogical results . . . . [I]t
would allow complaints to survive dismissal where “all” the facts
29. See Party City Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 305; Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp.
at 763-64. Arguing in support of the rejected amendment in question, Representative
Dingell noted that without it, “you must literally, in your pleadings, include the names of
confidential informants . . . .” 141 CONG. REC. 7277 (1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell). It is
noteworthy that the amendment in question related to scienter and not to the pleading of
falsity. See 141 CONG. REC. 7276 (1995) (statement of Rep. Bryant).
30. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
31. Id. at 314. In Novak, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ statements
regarding Ann Taylor Stores Corporation’s ongoing financial health were false in light of
the company’s “Box and Hold” practice. Id. at 304. This practice allowed the company to
enhance its appearance of profitability by warehousing obsolete, unsold merchandise
rather than marking it down for sale and recording the loss. Id. In pleading facts related to
the warehousing practices, the plaintiffs relied on confidential sources familiar with the
operation. See id. at 304-05.
32. Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff’s
complaint “provides none of the required facts underlying the complaint’s allegations . . .
nor does it direct the Court to where those facts might be found,” and further that “[i]f, in
fact, these unnamed ‘consultants’ provided information forming the basis for these
allegations, then the consultants should have been named in the complaint”).
33. On appeal, the defendants cited Silicon Graphics and several similarly reasoned
out-of-circuit opinions to support their contention that plaintiffs must identify confidential
sources in PSLRA pleadings. Novak, 216 F.3d at 313.
34. Id. (noting that despite attempts to include such an amendment, the ultimate
enactment does not require plaintiffs to name sources).
35. Id. at 314 n.1.
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supporting the plaintiff’s information and belief were pled, but
those facts were patently insufficient to support that belief.
Equally peculiarly, it would require dismissal where the complaint
pled facts fully sufficient to support a convincing inference if any
known facts were omitted.36

Most significantly, while noting PSLRA’s legislative objective of
reducing frivolous and abusive strike suits,37 the Second Circuit
posited that a per se rule requiring plaintiffs to name sources could
deter informants from cooperating with investigators in meritorious
securities fraud cases.38 Accordingly, the court held that the most
reasonable interpretation of “all facts” is that plaintiffs need only
plead “sufficient facts” to support the beliefs upon which they base
their allegations and need not always reveal confidential sources.39
Having abstractly held that plaintiffs need not always identify
their confidential sources, the Second Circuit outlined two distinct
paths by which a complaint that includes confidential sources can
overcome a motion to dismiss. The first path allows sources to remain
unnamed when “other facts . . . provide an adequate basis for
believing that the defendants’ statements were false.”40 That is, if the
complaint would otherwise survive a motion to dismiss based
exclusively on other facts pled, the court will not require the plaintiff
to name confidential sources. The alternative path requires
identification of the source “with sufficient particularity to support
the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source
would possess the information alleged.”41
The Second Circuit’s analysis did not expressly indicate whether
the two avenues for satisfying PSLRA’s heightened pleading
standards with confidential sources were to be examined separately
or together.42 Novak did not indicate that the test is always
disjunctive, nor did it specifically foreclose a holistic analysis which
allows for satisfaction of pleading requirements through a
combination of the two options.43
36. Id.
37. Id. at 306-07.
38. Id. at 314 (“Imposing a general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources
serves no legitimate pleading purpose while it could deter informants from providing critical
information to investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them.”).
39. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 314.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Nevertheless, the language of Novak suggests that the court established a
disjunctive test which could be satisfied only by one path or the other and not by a holistic
combination of the two. First, it is significant that the court left the phrase “other facts”
undefined. See id. Had its analysis envisioned a holistic approach, the court could have
easily clarified that “other facts” may include a description of the sources along the lines of
the second path. Such an instruction would have effectively merged the two options.
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B. Application of Novak
While their analyses take different forms and encompass different
factors, most circuits that have addressed the issue have adopted the
fundamental aspects of Novak.44 Even where courts apply Novak
differently, several key aspects are in harmony throughout the
circuits. More specifically, courts in most circuits have universally
accepted Novak’s central premise that PSLRA’s “all facts”
requirement does not per se require that plaintiffs name confidential
sources.45 Similarly, there has been broad recognition of PSLRA’s
dual, competing policy objectives of combating frivolous strike suits
while encouraging meritorious securities fraud claims.46
Despite broad acceptance of Novak’s fundamental underpinnings,
three different applications of Novak have emerged throughout the
circuits—the original Novak approach, the holistic approach, and the
permissive holistic approach. The approaches primarily differ in the
extent to which they consider the two paths available for a complaint
to meet PSLRA’s pleading requirement without naming confidential
sources holistically or separately.
1. The Original Novak Approach
The original Novak approach, developed in the Second Circuit,47
has been adopted by the Fourth,48 Fifth,49 and Seventh50 Circuits.
Additionally, the court introduces the second option with the transition “[m]oreover, even if
personal sources must be identified . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). This if/then structure
suggests that the description of sources path should only be considered once the “other
facts” avenue has proven unsatisfactory. Further, because the case was remanded to the
district court for reconsideration in light of the appellate court’s instructions, the lack of
guidance on how to weigh each path suggests that the court of appeals intended the two to
be considered separately. See id.
44. Wohl, supra note 1, at 559-60 (noting that the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits endorse Novak).
45. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2007); Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2006); Sparling v. Daou, 397 F.3d
704, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2005); Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146 (3d
Cir. 2004); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003); Mesko v.
Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29 (1st Cir. 2002); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v.
Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 351 (5th Cir. 2002); In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871,
881 (D. Minn. 2007); D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 739 (E.D. Mich.
2003); In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
46. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 477 F.3d at 171-72; Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d at 596; Cal.
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 146-47; Adams, 340 F.3d at 1095, 1099-1100; Cabletron,
311 F.3d at 30; ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group, 291 F.3d at 354; Novak, 216 F.3d at 306,
314; D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 754 n.28; In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig.,
105 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
47. 997 F. Supp. 425. See also In re Scottish Re Group Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370,
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Feasby v. Industri-Matematik Int’l Corp., No. 99 Civ. 8761
(LTS)(JCF), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22791, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003).
48. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 477 F.3d at 174 (proposing a “case-by-case assessment” of all
facts or, “[w]hen the complaint chooses to rely on facts provided by confidential sources,” a
separate assessment mirroring the second suggested path of Novak).
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This approach simply applies the analysis used in Novak without
analytical embellishment or structural adjustments. Although Novak
did not specifically call for the analysis to be separate, courts
purporting to adhere directly to its approach have interpreted it as
such. Unlike the more holistic approach discussed in the next
Section, the original Novak approach does not consider a totality of
facts encompassing both Novak paths together. Rather, it looks at
each option separately and independently of the other. Under this
approach, a plaintiff cannot meet the pleading standard by
combining facts from nonconfidential sources with a description of
his or her confidential source suggesting that the source would have
access to the information in question—the plaintiff must satisfy one
path or the other. In Tellabs, for example, the Seventh Circuit made
it clear that it considers the two paths separately by holding that
plaintiffs must “describe their sources with sufficient particularity ‘to
support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the
source would possess the information alleged,’ or in the alternative
provide other evidence to support their allegations.”51
Although courts in this first group have not elaborated on the
basic Novak analysis, they have provided some guidance on when a
plaintiff has or has not sufficiently described his or her confidential
sources. Courts in this camp have rejected complaints which fail to
provide any description or provide only nominal, boilerplate
descriptions such as an indication that the confidential sources were
discovered through “plaintiffs’ investigation.”52 Generic job
descriptions such as “director”53 and even specific titles such as
“Supervisor of Insurance Accounting” or “Executive of Pricing”54 have
also been found insufficient to satisfy the pleading standard. Courts
in this group have been more willing to accept descriptions that
provide dates of employment, job responsibilities, and the manner in
which the source came to know the information.55
49. Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 259 (5th Cir. 2005); ABC Arbitrage
Plaintiffs Group, 291 F.3d at 353; In re Fleming Cos. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 5-03MD-1530(TJW), MDL-1530, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26488, at *27-28, 68-69 (E.D. Tex.
June 10, 2004).
50. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d at 596; Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Sirva, Inc., No. 04
C 7644, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73375, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2006); Davis v. SPSS, Inc.,
431 F. Supp. 2d 823, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
51. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d at 596 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
52. See Fadem v. Ford Motor Co., No. 02 Civ. 0686 (CSH), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16898, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003).
53. See In re MSC Indus. Direct Co. Sec. Litig., 283 F. Supp. 2d 838, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
54. See Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73375, at *22-23.
55. See Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 777, 781-85 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(noting that an amended complaint’s failure to include the specific scope of the source’s
responsibilities and the manner in which he came to know the information pled made the
description insufficient); In re Fleming Cos. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26488, at *68-69 (holding that a complaint’s description of its confidential sources was

778

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:769

2. The Holistic Approach
The second application of Novak that has emerged among the
circuits adjusts the structure of the first approach and widens the
analysis. This holistic approach, adopted by the First,56 Third,57 and
to a lesser extent, the Ninth58 Circuits, looks at a totality of the facts
pled to determine whether or not they “provide an adequate basis for
believing that the defendants’ statements were false.”59 In making
this determination, the court will look to, among other things, “the
level of detail provided by the confidential sources, the corroborative
nature of the other facts alleged (including from other sources), the
coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the number of sources,
the reliability of the sources, and similar indicia.”60 This analysis
examines both paths used in the original Novak approach but does
not consider them separately; rather, it considers them to be
components of the totality of facts pled in determining whether or
not those facts are sufficient to support a belief in the allegations
pled on information and belief.61
In applying this second approach, courts have provided some
guidance as to what circumstances will and will not satisfy the
holistic analysis. One factor that has proven crucial in establishing
sufficiency is the degree of specificity present in information provided
by confidential sources. In Sekuk Global Enterprises v. KVH
Industries, the court concluded that statements by confidential
informants (whose job titles were included in the pleadings) met
PSLRA’s pleading requirement, in part, because of the level of
specificity and corroboration provided.62 The confidential sources
named a specific executive as making the orders in question as well

sufficient because it included dates of employment, descriptions of job responsibilities, and
a description of how each came to know the information pled).
56. See Mesko v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Sonus
Networks Sec. Litig., No. 04-10294-DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28272, at *73-75 (D.
Mass. May 10, 2006); In re Vertex Pharm., Inc., Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 2d 343, 353 (D.
Mass. 2005).
57. See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126,146-47 (3d Cir. 2004).
58. Sparling v. Daou, 397 F.3d 704, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (adopting the analysis from
Novak and indicating that it would use the factors listed in Cabletron to assess the
reliability of confidential sources).
59. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 29 (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000)).
60. Id. at 29-30.
61. See id. at 32 (“Each securities fraud complaint must be analyzed on its own facts;
there is no one-size-fits-all template. Sufficient evidence of one type might reduce or
eliminate the need for evidence in other categories . . . .”).
62. No. 04-306ML, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16628, at *20-21 (D.R.I. Aug. 11, 2005)
(pointing to specificity of job titles, volume of confidential sources, and consistency of
accounts as the basis for the allegations’ sufficiency under PSLRA).
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as the shipping company involved in the scheme.63 Similarly,
corroboration of facts by other confidential or documentary sources
has proven effective at overcoming PSLRA’s pleading requirements
in these circuits. In Cabletron, the case most closely associated with
the broader approach to Novak, the court noted the consistency of
information provided by the plaintiff’s numerous confidential sources
as a factor in satisfying the pleading standard.64
3. The Permissive Holistic Approach
A third approach to the general Novak analysis adopted by the
Tenth Circuit is a more permissive version of the holistic approach
adopted by courts in cases like Cabletron.65 As in Cabletron and cases
like it, this approach examines the facts in the pleading in their
totality to determine whether a sufficient basis has been established
to believe that the statements in question are false or misleading.66
This analysis makes that determination by considering the level of
detail, the number and aggregate coherence of facts, and other
factors suggesting that a reasonable person would find the
statements in question false or misleading.67
Whereas the other two approaches adopted by the circuits look for
sufficient descriptions of confidential or documentary sources or some
combination of the two, the Tenth Circuit approach, as illustrated in
Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., does not strictly require that a
plaintiff always reveal the source of the facts he or she pleads on
information and belief.68 The court advanced three justifications for
this position. First, the text of PSLRA does not expressly require
plaintiffs to identify sources, but rather only requires supporting
facts.69 Secondly, a requirement that plaintiffs always divulge their
sources amounts to an evidentiary pleading requirement.70 Finally,
the court reasoned that there would be circumstances in which the
63. Id.; see also Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 30 (describing statements from confidential
sources as sufficient because they were “not conclusory allegations of fraud, but specific
descriptions of the precise means through which it occurred”).
64. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 30; see also Pathfinder Mgmt., Inc. v. Mayne Pharma PTY,
No. 06-CV-2204 (WJM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61081, at *31-32 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2008)
(holding that a complaint pled sufficient particularity because the report of the company’s
new comptroller corroborated allegations from a confidential informant).
65. See Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1099-1101 (10th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 1099.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1101.
69. See id.
70. Id. At least one commentator has raised a similar concern that heightened factual
pleading requirements of PSLRA may amount to a violation of plaintiffs’ Seventh
Amendment rights. See generally Suja A. Thomas, The PSLRA’s Seventh Amendment
Problem (U. Cin. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 07-03, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968893.
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allegations would be sufficiently verifiable, making personal or
documentary sources simply unnecessary.71
While Adams did not recognize a per se requirement that sources
be identified, it did indicate that identification would strengthen
the extent to which a complaint met the PSLRA pleading standard.72
The Tenth Circuit further cautioned that when an information and
belief allegation does not identify the sources of its facts, “the facts
alleged . . . will usually have to be particularly detailed, numerous,
plausible, or objectively verifiable by the defendant before they will
support a reasonable belief that the defendant’s statements were
false or misleading.”73
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Special Considerations with Fabricated Sources
While the extent or even existence of fabricated sources
unsurprisingly evades statistical capture, several factors unique to
securities fraud litigation necessitate some level of assurance that
confidential sources exist. The rush to file an initial complaint and
serve as lead counsel for a securities class action suit encourages
hastily crafted pleadings.74 Working against this objective is PSLRA’s
requirement that plaintiffs plead their claims with particularity.
Making this task even more onerous is the stay of discovery
prompted by any pending motion to dismiss.75 For an unethical
plaintiff, the acceptance of Novak’s premise that confidential sources
must not always be named makes the fabrication of a confidential
source a tempting shortcut through PSLRA’s potentially burdensome
pleading standards. Though courts have been hesitant to directly
accuse a plaintiff of this tactic, judges have raised the issue.76
B. Potential Evaluative Pitfalls Stemming from Fabrication
Concerns
Concern that complaints are relying on fabricated confidential
sources gives rise to judicial demand for assurances that confidential
71.
72.
73.
74.

Adams, 340 F.3d at 1102.
See id.
Id. at 1103.
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 16:101 (2d ed. 2009).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006).
76. See Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (listing
among the court’s potential concerns with regard to a set of confidential sources the
possibility that “they don’t even exist”); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 193
(4th Cir. 2007) (Shedd, J., dissenting) (proposing a less rigorous pleading standard by
which plaintiffs simply plead “facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that [they] did
not merely invent sources”).
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sources represent actual persons. Thus, as a practical matter, the
presence of these concerns means the existing analysis for satisfying
PSLRA’s pleading standards must answer two questions:
1) Does the complaint sufficiently support a belief that the
confidential sources in question actually exist?; and
2) Do the facts alleged by those confidential sources, if taken
to be true, support a belief that the statements or omissions
in questions were false or misleading?
The first step in this process makes investigations of confidential
sources’ reliability intuitively appropriate. Such inquiries into
truthfulness and accuracy are not uncommon. The Cabletron court
included “reliability of the sources,” in its inexhaustive list of factors
to consider in determining whether a complaint relying on
confidential sources had met its pleading burden.77 It further listed
consistency of information from confidential sources as a factor in
favor of sufficiency because it “undermine[s] any argument that the
complaint relies unduly on the stories of just one or two former
employees, possibly disgruntled.”78 Although, based on the facts of
Cabletron, reliability of the sources was a positive factor in satisfying
the particularity requirement, the court’s language suggests that it
would have granted the motion to dismiss had it been suspicious of
the sources’ inclination for mendacity. The court in Sekulk was even
bolder in its exploration of source credibility, indicating that
corroboration of confidential sources’ statements is significant
because it “reinforces the potential veracity of their allegations.”79
1. Is Source Reliability an Acceptable Inquiry at the Pleading
Stage?
Determining whether inquiries into source reliability are
permissible requires a more precise interpretation of PSLRA’s “all
facts” pleading requirement for allegations made on information and
belief. As discussed, the broad acceptance of Novak means that courts
have interpreted “all facts” as all facts necessary to support a belief in
allegations made on information and belief. The operative question
then becomes whether the facts necessary to support such a belief are
those which logically support the allegation, or if “all facts” also
encompasses facts which make the plaintiff trust the confidential

77. Mesko v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002).
78. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
79. Sekuk Global Enters. v. KVH Indus., Inc., No. 04-306ML, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16628 at *20-21 (D.R.I. Aug. 11, 2005).
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source’s accuracy and honesty.80 Only if the latter is correct may a
court appropriately engage in source reliability inquiries. Absent
statutory guidance to the contrary, the standard level of judicial
skepticism should be applied; that is, when considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the court must apply a suspended level of
skepticism and construe all pled facts as true.81
Neither the text of PSLRA nor its legislative history suggests that
any such contrary guidance or intent to depart from the standard
approach is present. The Act provides that any defendant may move
for dismissal of a complaint that fails to meet the pleading standards
set forth in § 78u-4(b)(1) or (2).82 Since the mechanism for dismissal
will still be a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the aforementioned suspended
level of judicial skepticism must be applied to facts pled whether
their source is confidential or otherwise.
PSLRA’s legislative history similarly suggests that Congress
intended to raise pleading standards only with regard to the amount
of facts required and not as to their credibility.83 Representative
Christopher Cox clarified that the underlying facts which support an
allegation need not be proven at the pleading stage: “First of all, we
are talking today about allegations, so we do not need to know that
they are true.”84 He went on to characterize the appropriate
application of judicial scrutiny of the allegations: “[F]or purposes of
judging the pleading, all the court does is assume all of the
allegations are true even before you have actually proved them, and
if added together, assuming their truthfulness, they would state a
cause of action and you get by judgment on the pleadings . . . .”85
Unlike the provisions covering the pleading of falsity, the
applicable language governing the pleading of scienter requires that
the facts “giv[e] rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.”86 In Tellabs, the Supreme Court
interpreted this language as requiring courts to consider “competing
inferences” that can be drawn from the facts pled when determining
whether scienter has been sufficiently shown.87 In a relatively recent
80. To put it another way, does “necessary facts” simply include specific facts that
make the plaintiff believe the allegation or does it also encompass those facts which make
the plaintiff believe the source is correct and telling the truth?
81. St. George v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 92-56287, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
16869, at *2 (9th Cir. June 29, 1993); Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440,
442 (5th Cir. 1986); 7-Eleven Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7 Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00140-B, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 94835, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2006).
83. 141 CONG. REC. 7264 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. § 78u-4(b)(2).
87. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007).
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decision, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Tellabs as requiring
discounting information in pleadings attributed to confidential
sources.88 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that competing inferences as
to the reliability of the facts could not be made without knowledge of
the source and his or her tendency to tell the truth.89 If this
interpretation is correct, and the “strong inference” language of
PSLRA’s scienter requirement provides for inquiries into source
reliability, its absence from sections dealing with falsity further
suggest that no such inquiry should be made when determining the
sufficiency of facts supporting information and belief falsity
allegations. Even if the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is incorrect
and competing inferences are only to be made with regard to whether
the facts presumed true sufficiently show the appropriate state of
mind, it is clear that Congress intended courts to apply a lower level
of scrutiny to the pleading of falsity than that of scienter.
Given the absence of contrary legislative instruction, courts must
consider the motion to dismiss as they would any other—by taking
facts pled as true and refraining from inquiries into their credibility
or reliability. While reliability would be an important issue at trial, it
is not an appropriate consideration when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.90 A court’s judgment at the pleading stage as to
the reliability of a confidential source must not substitute the
judgment of the finder of fact and should not be included in an
appropriate PSLRA analysis. Rather, in applying the appropriate
standard to a determination of PSLRA’s pleading standards for
allegations of falsity based on information and belief, the court must
simply determine whether the facts pled, if true, support a belief in
the allegation in question.91 In making this determination, courts
88. Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2007).
89. Id. at 756-57 (“It is hard to see how information from anonymous sources could be
deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of plausible opposing inferences.
Perhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying.”).
90. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 n.8 (2007) (“[W]hen a complaint
adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a . . . court’s assessment that
the plaintiff will fail to . . . prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.”).
91. Although much has been made of the impact of Twombly on the factual
requirements of pleadings, it has little impact on the determination of factual sufficiency
here. Prior to Twombly, a complaint subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) was
dismissed for failure to state a claim only when no conceivable set of facts could be proven
that would support the plaintiff’s claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Twombly now requires plaintiffs provide facts that “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because complaints subject to PSLRA and
Rule 9(b) are already required to provide all facts upon which their allegations are based,
and courts are charged with determining whether or not those facts support the claim, the
shift in Twombly does not impact the analysis. See also Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477
F.3d 162, 173 (4th Cir. 2007) (clarifying that the pre-Twombly standard did not apply to
PSLRA claims in that “[t]he ‘all facts’ requirement is imposed . . . to determine the legal
sufficiency of the complaint . . . . [A] complaint is legally sufficient if it ‘state[s] a claim
upon which relief can be granted.’ . . . [U]nder the generally applicable notice pleading
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should look to whether the facts alleged amount to specific
allegations of fraud or whether they rise only to the level of formulaic
boilerplate allegations (e.g., “they were lying”) or vague rumors. For
example, an overly broad allegation from a confidential source of
rumors relating to the falsity of a statement, even if taken to be 100%
accurate, would only amount to the existence of that rumor and
would not be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Such an
assessment is in line with the standard of review discussed above as
it does not purport to assess the credibility or accuracy of the facts.
2. May Courts Look for Assurances that Sources Actually Exist?
Given the aforementioned limitations on a court’s ability to
inquire as to the reliability of confidential sources, the issue arises as
to whether the court may seek assurances that confidential sources
exist and are not fabricated. While courts must suspend their
skepticism with regard to the accuracy of facts at the pleading stage,
they may not do so in determining whether the facts pled amount to
a cognizable claim. At the heart of an allegation pled on information
and belief is the idea that the plaintiff does not have direct
knowledge of the facts in question but has been informed of them by
a source and believes that information.92 Thus, the fundamental issue
of how a plaintiff generally came to be informed of the information
pled is a crucial fact in support of a belief in the allegation in
question. Here, the court is not determining whether the confidential
source has given reason to justify the plaintiff’s belief in the
information provided, but rather whether the plaintiff is, in fact,
pleading an allegation on information and belief. To the extent that
there is not a sufficient basis to believe that the plaintiff is informed
and believes the allegations in question, the complaint is not
factually sufficient as to that allegation. A court’s seeking of
assurances that a confidential source is not fabricated does not
constitute a reliability analysis as to that source—rather, it is a
factual sufficiency determination as to the pleading itself.

rules, this standard requires the court to ask whether any conceivable set of facts could be
proved consistent with the complaint’s allegations that would permit relief to be granted.
The PSLRA’s ‘all facts’ standard, however, changes the relevant set of facts for alleging
misrepresentations and omissions to those alleged in the complaint. Under the PSLRA,
therefore, our inquiry becomes whether, if those facts alleged in the complaint are true,
relief could be granted on the plaintiffs’ claim.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
Jonathan M. Hoff & Martin L. Seidel, Impact of ‘Twombly’ on Notice Pleading, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 13, 2007, at 4 (discussing the impact of Twombly on pleading the elements of
securities fraud that are not already subject to heightened factual pleading standards on
account of Rule 9(b) or PSLRA).
92. See supra note 23.
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C. A Two-Step Evaluation of Confidential Sources and Their Facts
The natural inclination to assuage concerns about source
fabrication with impermissible evaluations of credibility and
reliability would be significantly reduced by a two-step approach.
Under such an analysis a court would look first for adequate
assurances that the sources do in fact exist. After finding such
assurances the court’s analysis would move to the second step to
determinate whether the facts provided by the sources support a
belief in the allegations in question.
1. Adequate Assurances
The first part in this two-step analysis can be satisfied so long
as the court’s analysis does not shift from a factual evaluation of
whether the source exists to a reliability analysis of whether the
source is to be believed. Thus, a range of possibilities exists.93 The
positional aspect of the original Novak approach (evaluation of
whether the confidential source is sufficiently described to support
a belief that a person similarly situated would have access to the
information pled) is one option so long as it is applied with
limitations. A plaintiff could provide a sufficiently detailed
description of how its confidential source came to know the
information in question. Here, the court would not look at whether
these details suggest the source was reasonably well informed.
Rather, it would determine if the description was sufficiently
detailed to render discovery ineffective for finding and producing a
witness with the described back story if the case made it through
pleading and the source was in fact fabricated. Details beyond how
the source came to know the information could also be pled to
achieve the same effect of narrowing the possible field of sources.94
Such details could assuage concerns about source fabrication
without a need for the court to indulge in overreaching
assessments of the information’s credibility.
Consideration of the level of detail provided by the confidential
source may also be of use in this phase of the analysis. As with a
unique description of the source, this factor may only be considered
for its tendency to suggest a nonfictitious source. That is to say, a
93. Though not provided for by PSLRA, an in-camera presentation of the source’s
identity is one judicial tool that could be considered in addition to the pleading of
additional facts to assure the court that confidential sources have not been fabricated.
94. For instance, a description of a confidential source which states that the
individual was employed by the defendant during a specific time, was involved at a
management level, attended the University of Florida, and has green eyes might not be
enough information to expose the source to reprisal, but it would likely narrow the pool
enough to dash the plans of a plaintiff who hopes to find a source in discovery who can
provide the information attributed to a fabricated source at the pleading stage.
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high level of factual detail is likely to come from an actual source and
not be a product of fabrication. Further, if the information was the
product of source fabrication, discovery would be unlikely to produce
a source that could speak to the details at trial. To be clear, the level
of detail provided should not be considered for its tendency to show
that, by virtue of lack of details, the confidential source is mistaken
or is being dishonest. The inference, for example, that a confidential
source’s lack of details on a particular matter suggests that she is illinformed, exaggerating her knowledge of the issue, or is otherwise
mistaken would amount to an impermissible assessment of source
reliability at the pleading stage.
2. Sufficiency of Facts
In the next stage of the analysis, courts would determine whether
the facts pled, if true, support a belief in the allegation in question.
This second step should only be undertaken once the court
determines that the plaintiff has pled facts which provide sufficient
assurance that its confidential sources are not fictitious. Having
made this determination, courts may evaluate the facts pled with the
appropriate level of suspended skepticism and without lingering
intuitive concern over the potential nonexistence of confidential
sources. Having culled dubious sources and their attendant facts in
the first stage of the analysis, the court may proceed with a
straightforward assessment of the facts. The appropriate analysis
would be the same as that applied to any motion to dismiss except
that the court would look to the facts pled rather than contemplating
the complaint in terms of any plausible set of facts.95 This analysis
should examine the level of specificity provided by the facts to
determine whether or not they support a belief in the allegation
made on information and belief. The application of this standard is
not only in line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is also
consistent with Congress’s aim of reforming private securities
litigation law without placing undue burden on meritorious cases.96
V. CONCLUSION
Demand for assurances that confidential sources are real and the
potential for overstepping, inherent in the existing approaches to
Novak, increase the appeal of such a two-step analysis. Further, an
independent step which focuses on culling fabricated sources serves

95. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
96. S. REP. NO.104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689.
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PSLRA’s policy objective of combating strike suits that seek to use
discovery as a “fishing expedition.”97
This Note has argued that inquiries into the reliability or
credibility of confidential sources used to plead falsity in federal
securities litigation are prohibited by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and counter to the legislative intent of PSLRA. To address
the very real concern of fabricated sources in such actions, this Note
has also proposed a two-step process for use in determining whether
a complaint subject to PSLRA which relies on confidential sources for
its allegations of falsity may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
plead with sufficient particularity. This process looks first for
sufficient assurances that the confidential sources are, in fact, real
and then determines whether the facts stated by those sources
support a sufficient basis for believing the allegations made on
information and belief. Such a two-step approach is consistent with
PSLRA’s twin legislative objectives of combating strike suits while
preserving the deterrence and enforcement function provided by
private securities litigation. It does so by separately addressing the
unique potential for fabrication presented by complaints relying on
confidential witnesses such that courts may review the pled facts of
the case without a level of skepticism beyond that permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This proposed analysis is not
fundamentally at odds with existing approaches applied throughout
the circuits. Rather, it restructures the analysis in the hope of
keeping separate two decidedly disparate considerations: (1) the
existence of the confidential sources and (2) the facts’ tendency to
support a belief in the allegations made on information and belief. By
deconstructing and separating the existing analysis, this approach
enables courts to determine the sufficiency of the pled facts, free from
otherwise very reasonable concerns regarding fabricated sources. An
analysis that rigorously keeps out fictitious confidential sources,
without inappropriately raising the level of scrutiny for facts pled,
achieves a balance between combating strike suits and encouraging
meritorious claims. In doing so, this approach threads the policy
needle and achieves a result in line with PSLRA’s objectives.

97. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736.
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